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Abstract
This paper raises the problem of judgment aggregation in science.
The problem has two sides. First, how do scientists decide which
propositions to assert in a collaborative document? And second, how
should they make such decisions? The literature on judgment aggre-
gation is relevant to the second question. Although little evidence is
available regarding the first question, it suggests that current scientific
practice is not in line with the most plausible recommendations from
the judgment aggregation literature. We explore the evidence that is
presently available before suggesting a number of avenues for future
research on this problem.
1 Introduction
Science is an increasingly collaborative enterprise. Not only are single-
authored papers now almost unheard of, massive collaborations such as the
ATLAS collaboration at CERN are now common as well.
∗Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 161, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,
PA 15213-3890, USA. Email: lbright@andrew.cmu.edu.
†University of Pittsburgh, Department of History and Philosophy of Science, 1017
Cathedral of Learning, Pittsburgh, PA 15260, USA. Email: had27@pitt.edu.
‡Department of Philosophy, Baker Hall 161, Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh,
PA 15213-3890, USA. Email: rheesen@cmu.edu. The author list is alphabetical.
1
Widespread collaboration, for all its virtues, brings with it a new set of
problems. One such problem is the topic of this paper. It is the problem of
determining what to say in a co-authored talk or paper. Given a group of
scientists and their opinions on various matters related to the paper, what
does “the group” think?
The answer to this question has obvious epistemic and ethical conse-
quences. If the group lets each member write their own section of the paper,
the epistemic status of the statements in a given section is tied directly to
its author, and ethical responsibility (say, in cases of suspected fraud) can
be divided as well. Whereas if the group only publishes work that all au-
thors have agreed to unanimously, epistemic and ethical responsibilities are
divided more evenly among the group.
Despite these important consequences, the above question, which we will
call the question of judment aggregation in science, has received very little
attention. We are not aware of any scholarly work that directly addresses
either the descriptive question how scientists aggregate judgments or the
normative question how scientists in particular should aggregate judgments.
However, there is a literature on judgment aggregation in general that
we think could fruitfully be applied to this question. It provides a formal
framework for studying judgment aggregation in science and putative answers
to the normative question.
In this paper we show that the problem faced by collaborating scientists
has the formal structure assumed in the judgment aggregation literature (sec-
tion 2). We survey this literature and extract normative recommendations
(section 3). We look at what scientists say they do and what scientists say
they should do, and find that they diverge from each other and from the
recommendations of the judgment aggregation literature (section 4). We
conclude that scientific practice could be improved by more empirical and
normative investigation of judgment aggregation in science.
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2 Motivation
In November 1997, the National Institutes of Health (NIH) organized a con-
sensus conference on the topic of acupuncture. Its self-described goal was to
“provide health care providers, patients, and the general public with a re-
sponsible assessment of the use and effectiveness of acupuncture for a variety
of conditions” (NIH 1997, p. 1).
The conference consisted of a panel of 12 scientists with various kinds
of relevant expertise, with input (through presentations) from another 25
experts. Another 1,200 people were in attendance as audience members.
Over the course of the three-day conference, the panel developed answers
to the (pre-defined) questions about the role and efficacy of acupuncture as
a treatment option, its biological effects, issues in integrating acupuncture in
today’s health-care system, and directions for future research. These answers
were written up into a consensus statement, subject to revision based on
expert and audience comments:
The panel composed a draft statement, which was read in its en-
tirety and circulated to the experts and the audience for comment.
Thereafter, the panel resolved conflicting recommendations and
released a revised statement at the end of the conference. . . The
draft statement was made available on the World Wide Web im-
mediately following its release at the conference and was updated
with the panel’s final revisions. (NIH 1997, p. 1)
This process is typical of consensus conferences, which have been held by
the NIH and other organizations with some frequency over the last decades
(Wortman et al. 1988). We draw attention to four features of this process:
1. A final document is produced which asserts certain propositions.
2. This final document purports to reflect the collective view of a group of
people: at minimum, the 12 panel members; at best, the consensus of
“the field”. It does not purport to reflect the view of any one individual.
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3. The individuals involved in the production of the document have views
on the propositions asserted in it, and these serve as input to the pro-
duction of the document.
4. The propositions asserted in the document are logically related (some
propositions in the document are asserted to follow from other ones).
This raises a problem which we will call a “judgment aggregation problem”.
A judgment aggregation problem asks how, given a group of individuals with
views on a number of logically related propositions, the collective view of
that group on those propositions is to be determined.
Consensus conferences are a particularly clear instance of a judgment
aggregation problem. But this kind of problem occurs all over science. In
particular, any time two or more scientists write a paper (or a talk) together,
they have to solve a judgment aggregation problem (all of the above four
features are present in such a case). With collaborative work now the norm
in science, judgment aggregation problems are everywhere.
These considerations motivate the following two questions.
1. A descriptive question: How do scientists in fact solve judgment aggre-
gation problems?
2. A normative question: How should scientists solve judgment aggrega-
tion problems?
Regarding the former question, very little is known. We review the (informal)
evidence that exists in section 4.
The latter question has been studied in a branch of social choice theory
called “judgment aggregation”. The problem was first raised in the legal
context by Kornhauser and Sager (1993). Formal study of the problem took
off in earnest with the work of List and Pettit (2002), which spawned a
thriving literature.
This literature is concerned with judgment aggregation problems in gen-
eral, not with such problems as faced in particular by collaborating scientists.
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In the next section we review some of this literature with the aim of seeing
whether it yields any particular recommendations for scientists.
3 Possibilities and Impossibilities in Judgment
Aggregation
The judgment aggregation literature studies judgment aggregation functions,
which take the judgments of a group of individuals on a number of logi-
cally related propositions as input, and yield a collective judgment on those
propositions as output. It might be thought that applying this framework to
collaborative scientific work is a non-starter, due to the following theorem.
Theorem 1 (List and Pettit (2002)). There exists no judgment aggrega-
tion function which yields complete and consistent aggregate judgments and
satisfies “universal domain”, “anonymity”, and “systematicity”.
This theorem shows that the following desiderata on a judgment aggregation
function cannot be jointly satisfied.
1. Complete aggregate judgments: This means that the aggregation func-
tion yields judgments on all relevant propositions.
2. Consistent aggregated judgments: This means that the aggregation
function’s judgments are logically consistent.
3. Universal domain: This means that the aggregation procedure can be
applied to any combination of (complete and consistent) individual
judgments on the relevant propositions.
4. Anonymity: All individuals are considered equal. More formally, if the
judgments of two individuals are switched, the result of the judgment
aggregation procedure does not change.
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5. Systematicity: All propositions are considered equal. More formally, if
the judgments of all individuals are the same on two propositions, then
the aggregation procedure should lead the group to either accept both
of them or deny both of them.
But the theorem only presents a problem if we think they state norms that
collaborating scientists should (try to) live up to. We think that anonymity,
systematicity, and consistency reflect stable norms of scientific practice, for
better or worse, but completeness and universal domain do not.
Anonymity reflects the norm that scientific contributions should be valued
independently of the person that made them. Systematicity reflects the norm
that scientists should be unbiased: their methods should not prejudge the
truth or falsity of any proposition. Consistency reflects the norm that a paper
(or talk, or consensus statement) should not contradict itself.
Completeness requires that the paper (or talk, or consensus statement)
pronounces a judgment on all relevant propositions. Even apart from the
question how to determine which propositions are relevant, this is obviously
not a norm of science. It is true that writing on some topics requires saying
something about related topics, but this is never so specific as to require
either asserting or denying specific propositions.
Universal domain requires that a paper (or talk, or consensus statement)
needs to be produced regardless of the views of the individuals involved,
i.e., no matter how much they disagree. Again this does not seem to be
a norm of science. In fact, it is commonly accepted practice, especially in
large collaborations, for scientists to take their name off a paper if they find
themselves unable to support its conclusions. This happened, for example,
when the Collision Detector at Fermilab (CDF) produced evidence that some
interpreted as evidence for mysterious extra muons: ghost particles that are
suggestive of new physics. The results were published in an online preprint,
but they were so controversial that nearly a third of the roughly 600 scientists
involved refused to sign it (CDF Collaboration 2008).
If universal domain is dropped as a desideratum, the other desiderata
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can be satisfied. In this case proposition-wise majority voting emerges as a
reasonable aggregation procedure. Proposition-wise majority voting, as the
name suggests, considers each proposition individually and takes the collec-
tive judgment on that proposition to be whatever is the majority judgment
among the individuals.
Dietrich and List (2010) prove a number of theorems to the effect that
if the domain is restricted by requiring individuals’ judgments to show cer-
tain kinds of “similarity” then proposition-wise majority voting satisfies all
the other desiderata. They also prove that on any domain where majority
voting yields consistent aggregate judgments, it is the unique aggregation
procedure that satisfies anonymity (as above) and acceptance/rejection neu-
trality (which requires that if all individuals flip their judgment on a given
proposition, the aggregate judgment should flip as well).
We conclude that the state-of-the-art normative recommendation from
the judgment aggregation literature to collaborating scientists is to use proposition-
wise majority voting whenever it yields consistent aggregation judgments,
and not to produce a collective document at all when it does not. One might
consider dropping completeness, however, the strongest normative recom-
mendation from the judgment aggregation literature is obtained by dropping
only universal domain.
4 What Is Known?
In section 2 we raised two questions concerning how scientists aggregate
judgments.
1. A normative question: How should scientific collaborations aggregate
their judgments?
2. A descriptive question: How do scientific collaborations in fact aggre-
gate their judgments?
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As far as we know, there have been no studies that investigated the former
question directly. All the evidence that is available is from case studies
of scientific collaborations that were not specifically interested in judgment
aggregation, but where it was mentioned because it came up as a practical
problem (we cite one such study below). We intend to remedy this, but that
is beyond the scope of this paper.
With regard to the latter question, there are two sources of evidence.
First, we could look at the literature on judgment aggregation, determine
which of the various conditions considered in that literature are satisfied in
the case of scientific collaborations, and obtain an answer that way. We gave
a preliminary discussion of such conditions in section 3, and concluded that
the judgment aggregation literature would arguably recommend proposition-
wise majority voting.
Second, we could see what scientists have themselves said about the rules
by which their judgments should be aggregated. Here we give two exam-
ples. First, the International Committee of Medical Journal Editors (ICMJE)
speaks to this in a document with recommendations for authors involved in
collaborative scientific projects. The document the ICMJE produces is es-
pecially significant, since it is recommended reading by the U.S. National
Science Foundation to those who receive funding from it. The ICMJE guide-
lines are hence plausibly taken as authoritative for a wide range of scientific
collaborations. The ICMJE requires that “[a]ll members of the group named
as authors. . . should have full confidence in the accuracy and integrity of the
work of other group authors” (ICMJE 2013, p. 3).
To us, this reads like a requirement of unanimity: every author should
agree to every proposition asserted in the collaborative document. Note
that this requirement is probably motivated by ethical rather than epistemic
considerations, in particular related to assigning blame in cases of suspected
fraud.
However, this norm is arguably too restrictive. Based on anecdotal evi-
dence, we think that working scientists do not regard this norm as realistic
8
and hence ignore it. This highlights an important reason for studying the
processes of judgment aggregation in science, and in particular the norma-
tive question. Presently policy is unguided by theory, and hence is (and is
seen to be) unmotivated, and is thus ignored by working scientists. If we are
to have policy here it would be worth more explicit reflection on what the
desiderata for such policy are, as well as what sort of policies would fulfill
those desiderata.
For a second example, consider the case of Nobel Prize winner Carlo
Rubbia. Leading a lab meeting of his research team at CERN in the 1980s,
Rubbia found that people were evenly split on whether a particular proposi-
tion should be presented as well-confirmed at an upcoming conference.
“So we’re in a pretty shitty mess, aren’t we?” he said. “I cannot
neglect the fact that people who are working on it have more
weight than people who aren’t. It’s also clear that we cannot run
science on a majority basis.” (Taubes 1986, p. 218)
Here Rubbia explicitly contradicts the claim (which we attributed to the
judgment aggregation literature) that proposition-wise majority voting is an
appropriate norm for judgment aggregation in science. This brings to light a
further important reason for studying the process of judgment aggregation in
science, this time focusing on the descriptive question. The manner in which
one aggregates judgments can make an important difference to the content
of what one accepts. For example, Rubbia’s group ended up asserting a
proposition which they would not have asserted if they had used majority
rule. This shows that different aggregation procedures can lead to the same
set of opinions resulting in different publications.
Social epistemologists and philosophers of science, as well as science schol-
ars more generally, should thus be interested in the actual procedures of judg-
ment aggregation scientists use. Perhaps especially if, as Rubbia suggests,
scientists’ behavior is not in line with what judgment aggregation theorists
would themselves think natural or appropriate.
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5 Conclusion
Scientists regularly face judgment aggregation problems in the process of col-
laborative research. The judgment aggregation literature makes it clear just
how difficult it can be to solve those problems. Little is presently known
about how scientists address these problems in practice. Our initial investi-
gations, reported here, suggest that scientists are not solving these problems
in a way that would be endorsed by the judgment aggregation literature. Nei-
ther are scientists solving these problems in a way that the explicit guidance
of the ICMJE would suggest. Thus the main results of our initial investiga-
tions are negative, telling us only about what scientists are not doing.
Further research is needed to establish both what would be optimal for
scientists to do, and what they are presently doing. The judgment aggre-
gation literature suggests a promising method of investigation for resolving
the normative question. Without departing from what is standard method-
ology in that field we can use the machinery of judgment aggregation theory
to formulate abstract principles derived from what is already known about
the normative structure of science. Once these are clearly expressed it will
be possible to derive results about what functions would satisfy our various
commitments. The descriptive question, on the other hand, raises its own
methodological challenges, since there is typically no record left of the man-
ner in which collaborative teams solve judgment aggregation problems, nor
may the team members even be conscious of their own process. We hope
that our raising these questions will lead to more attention being directed to
solving them.
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